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‘European’ DPAs as Guardians of Consistency?
Andra Giurgiu and Tine A Larsen*
Safeguarding the rights of the citizens to the protection of their personal data in an era of
nearly ubiquitous computing has become increasingly challenging. National data protec-
tion authorities (DPAs), central actors in the data protection landscape, face a difficult task
when fulfilling their missions and acting as guardians of these rights under the provisions
of the outdated Directive 95/46/EC. Critical decisions of the Court of Justice of the European
Union illustrate the challenge of 'stretching' the provisions regarding the powers and com-
petences of DPAs under the Directive to make them applicable to current data processing
realities. The article points out the existing problems under the current framework with re-
gard to powers and competence of DPAs and examines if and to what extent they are mend-
ed by the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). It analyses substantive and procedur-
al aspects of the new cooperation model under the one-stop-shop and consistency mecha-
nisms and discusses whether and how these new tools successfully contribute to solve exist-
ing problems.
I. Introduction: Data Protection
Authorities as a Fundamental Pillar of
EU Data Protection Law
The European right to the protection of personal da-
ta builds on three main pillars: the obligations of da-
ta controllers, the rights of data subjects and the role
of data protection authorities (DPAs).1 The existence
and well-functioning of independent DPAs in the
Member States constitutes ‘an essential component’
of European Union (EU) personal data protection.2
There has been important case-law from the Court
of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) on the need
to ensure the independence of national DPAs3 exact-
ly because of their fundamental role as regards mon-
itoring theapplicationandensuringcompliancewith
data protection law, as well as generally acting as
guardians of the rights of citizens as far as the pro-
tection of their personal data is concerned.
According to Directive 95/46/EC4, each Member
State has the obligation to set up a national DPA, the
mission of which is to monitor the application of the
national data protection laws implementing the EU
Directive. DPAs derive this mandate from legal in-
* Andra Giurgiu is Post-Doctoral Researcher at the Interdisciplinary
Centre for Security, Reliability and Trust (SnT) of the University of
Luxembourg; for correspondence: <andra.giurgiu@uni.lu>. Tine
A Larsen is the President of the National Commission for Data
Protection of Luxembourg; for correspondence: <info@cnpd.lu>.
1 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of
24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the
processing of personal data and on the free movement of such
data, O.J. L 281, 23 November 1995, recital 62; see also Gloria
González Fuster, ‘Beyond the GDPR, above the GDPR’ (Internet
Policy Review, 30 November 2015) <http://policyreview.info/articles/
news/beyond-gdpr-above-gdpr/385> accessed 18 August 2016.
2 Directive 95/46/EC, recital 62.
3 For the CJEU case-law on the independence of national data
protection authorities see also Case C-518/07 European Commis-
sion v Federal Republic of Germany [2010] ECLI:EU:C:2010:125;
Case C- 614/10 European Commission v Republic of Austria
[2012] ECLI:EU:C:2012:631; Case C-288/12 Commission v Hun-
gary [2014] ECLI:EU:C:2014:237; but also Case C-362/14 Max-
imillian Schrems v Data Protection Commissioner [2015]
ECLI:EU:C:2015:650.
4 Directive 95/46/EC, art 28 para 1.
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struments of primary law, more specifically, Article
16(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the Euro-
peanUnion (TFEU) aswell asArticle 8(3) of the Char-
ter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.
As such, as Hijmans observes, DPAs have a rather hy-
brid status in the sense that they are ‘attached to the
constitutional frameworks of the Member States as
well as to that of the European Union’.5According to
the same author, even though they are national bod-
ies that have been established under national law,
DPAs exercise their tasks on the basis of primary EU
law.6 This status, between EU andMember State law,
has been defining in the way DPAs have performed
their role under the general mandate created by Di-
rective 95/46/ECbut subject to the constraints of hav-
ing to take into account the national context of their
own Member State law.
Adopted at a time when the Internet was still in
its infancy, Directive 95/46/ECproves to be rather dif-
ficult to mould to the current realities of ubiquitous
computing. It becomes thus clear that a new piece of
legislation was much needed to cope with the data
protection challenges of today’s Internet age. This ar-
ticle will examine the competence and powers of
DPAs under the current Directive 95/46/EC, with par-
ticular reference to the relevant jurisprudence of the
CJEU. It analyses the major changes brought by the
General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)7 in the
way DPAs exercise their role in view of the new, lay-
ered competence as well as of the set of clear, ho-
mogenous powers they have been endowed with.
Furthermore the article discusses the GDPR’s new co-
operation model under the one-stop-shop and con-
sistency mechanisms. The final considerations ad-
dress the questions of whether and how these
changes successfully manage to solve the existing
problems.
II. Data Protection Authorities under
Directive 95/46/EC
1. Competence and Powers
The competence of a DPA is determined by the na-
tional law of that specific Member State and linked
to the territoriality principle. Under the Directive, a
DPA, like any other national public authority, can
therefore only exercise its powers within the territo-
ry of the Member State where it is established and
based on the national law of the same state.
A clash between applicable law and competence
is however possible especially in today’s context of
widespread cross-border data processing, enabled by
the use of the Internet. In reality, a processing could
fall under the law of one Member State, depending
on the place of the establishment of the controller,
while the competence of the DPA would be deter-
mined according to the lawof anotherMember State,
such as that where the affected data subjects reside.
Directive 95/46/EC explicitly states that a DPA ‘is
competent, whatever the national law applicable to
the processing in question’ is.8 This general compe-
tence leaves it open for a DPA to apply, in limited cir-
cumstances9, the lawof anotherMember State.10The
issue remains however one of applicable law11 to the
processing in question as the actual powers of the
DPAwillbedeterminedaccording to thegeneral rules
on competence as set out in its own national law.
Such a conflicting situation has been examined by
the CJEU in Weltimmo12, a case we will refer to in
more detail at a later stage of our analysis.
There are a fewdefiningpoints as regards thepow-
ers of DPAs under the current Directive 95/46/EC.
Firstly, since the Directive is not directly applicable
in the Member States, it had to be implemented by
transposition into national law. This created differ-
ences across the EU and thus legal uncertainty for
businesses and data subjects alike. Hence, the need
to counter the lack of harmonisation of data protec-
tion laws across the EU, which was one of the main
5 Hielke Hijmans, ‘The EU as a constitutional guardian of internet
privacy and data protection’ (PhD thesis, University of Amster-
dam, 2016) 287, downloaded from UvA-DARE, the institutional
repository of the University of Amsterdam (UvA) <http://hdl
.handle.net/11245/2.169421> accessed 18 August 2016.
6 ibid 311.
7 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons
with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free
movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (Gen-
eral Data Protection Regulation), OJ L 119, 4 May 2016, 1–88.
8 Directive 95/46/EC, art 28 para 6.
9 Following the application of art 4 para 1 Directive 95/46/EC.
10 Ulrich Damman and Spiros Simitis, EG-Datenschutzrichtilinie:
Kommentar (1997) 306.
11 For a more detailed analysis on the matter of applicable law see
also Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 8/2010
on applicable law, WP 179 (10 December 2010); Update of
Opinion 8/2010 on applicable law in light of the CJEU judgement
in Google Spain, WP 179 (update of 16 December 2015).
12 Case C-230/14 Weltimmo s.r.o. v Nemzeti Adatvédelmi és
Információszabadság Hatóság [2015] EU:C:2015:639.
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objectives of the proposal of the new GDPR,13 and to
create a single set of rules. Time will show if this ob-
jective can be fully reached in practice.14
Secondly, Directive 95/46/EC could not be overly
prescriptive, as it had to leave national legislators
room for the implementation. Thus the powers of
DPAs are defined only in a general manner. They are
grouped into basic categories as: investigative pow-
ers, powers of intervention, powers to engage in le-
gal proceedings and to hear claims.15 Additionally, a
DPA has advisory powers and should be consulted
by national legislators when they draw up regula-
tions or administrativemeasures relating to data pro-
tection.16
The investigative powers include the power to ac-
cess data and the power to collect information,which
the DPA needs for the performance of its duties. A
DPA is also endowed with effective powers of inter-
vention, which can be grouped into two categories.
Firstly, there are powers of intervention with direct
legal effect, such as blocking, erasure, destruction of
data, or imposing a ban on processing. Secondly, the
powers of intervention can have an indirect effect as
in the case of warning or admonishing the controller
or referring thematter tonational parliaments or oth-
er political institutions.17 Lastly, DPAs can engage in
legal proceedings as well as bring violations of na-
tional data protection provisions to the attention of
judicial authorities.
The lack of harmonisation of national implemen-
tation laws with regard to the powers of DPAs can be
well exemplified by looking at the way sanctions are
regulated in the different Member States. Article 24
of Directive 95/46/EC states thatMember States have
to ‘lay down the sanctions to be imposed in case of
infringement of the provisions adopted pursuant to
this Directive’. However, the Directive does not clear-
ly and explicitly state that a DPA shall be able to im-
pose fines.18 This general provision has left it open
for the national legislator to determine who can ap-
ply the sanctions, following which national law as
well as the type of sanctions available. As a conse-
quence, the sanctions for infringing data protection
law can be enshrined in criminal or administrative
law, they can be applied by courts or national DPAs
and their nature can be pecuniary or non-pecuniary.
This led to major differences in their application
throughout the EU. According to a report of the Eu-
ropean Fundamental Rights Agency, in Lithuania
sanctions can only take the form of criminal fines
imposed by judicial authorities. In Germany, on the
other hand, judicial authorities can also order deten-
tionandDPAsare themselves endowedwith thepow-
er to impose administrative fines.19The obvious con-
sequence is that some Member State DPAs are
‘stronger’ while others are ‘weaker’ in the enforce-
ment of data protection law.
Especially against this background of legal frag-
mentation cooperation plays a particularly impor-
tant role. DPAs have a general obligation to cooper-
ate in the performance of their duties, in particular
by exchanging all useful information, andmay be re-
quested to exercise their powers by an authority of
another Member State.20 This model of ‘horizontal
cooperation’ is characterised by a lack of hierarchy,
shared responsibilities, a common interest, good
faith and good administration.21 Under Directive
95/46/EC cooperation is however not ‘institution-
alised’ through clear rules and strict time frames but
takes place at a rather informal level.
The Directive creates another layer of cooperation
by establishing the Working Party on the Protection
of Individuals with regard to the Processing of Per-
sonal Data22 (Article 29 Working Party) which acts
like a ‘structured network of DPAs’23. The Article 29
Working Party (A29WP) is composed of representa-
tives of the DPAs of each Member State and of the
EuropeanData Protection Supervisor. It fulfils an ad-
visory role, mainly by delivering opinions, recom-
13 See Press Release of the European Commission (25 January 2012)
<http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-12-46_en.htm?locale=en
> accessed 18 August 2016.
14 It has been pointed that despite the formal harmonization, the
Regulation still contains many ‘flexibilities’ which would allow for
a divergent transposition of the Regulation by Member States. For
a full analysis of these flexibilities see the analysis by European
Digital Rights (EDRi), ‘Flexibilities in the General Data Protection
Regulation’ (2016) <https://edri.org/files/GDPR_analysis/EDRi
_analysis_gdpr_flexibilities.pdf> accessed 8 August 2016.
15 Directive 95/46/EC, art 28 para 3 and 4.
16 For an analysis of the powers of DPAs see also the European
Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, Data Protection in the
European Union: The Role of National Data Protection Authori-
ties (2010) 20-28.
17 Damman and Simitis (n 10) 309.
18 See also Lee A. Bygrave, Data Privacy Law: An International
Perspective (Oxford University Press 2014) 172.
19 See also the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (n
16) 34.
20 Directive 95/46/EC, art 28 para 6.
21 Hijmans (n 5) 370.
22 Directive 95/46/EC, art 29.
23 Hijmans (n 5) 373.
EDPL 3|2016 345Roles and Powers of National Data Protection Authorities
mendations and reports to promote the uniform ap-
plication of Directive 95/46/EC in all Member States.
As one author remarks, the A29 WP is probably the
‘most significant embodiment of regional coordina-
tion’.24 Its role is however limited to giving guidance.
Compared to its successor under the GDPR, the Eu-
ropeanData Protection Board, theWorking Party has
a significantly weaker position.
The issuesof competenceandpowersofDPAsplay
a particularly important role in the context of the
widespread and practically borderless Internet use
of today. So far, we have discussed the legal frame-
work as well as highlighted some of the theoretical
problemsas regards competence andpowers ofDPAs
under Directive 95/46/EC. In the following section,
this article will examine the challenges of applying
this outdated Directive in the current Internet age by
referring to some of themost relevant and controver-
sial jurisprudence of the CJEU, which deals with the
issues of competence and powers of DPAs.
2. Relevant CJEU Case-Law: Stretching
the Powers and Competences of DPAs
under Directive 95/46/EC
Today, EU and non-EU companies are constantly of-
fering services to EU residents or are monitoring
their behaviour. Under Directive 95/46/EC, data sub-
jects face the difficult task of defending and enforc-
ing the right to the protection of their personal data
rights vis-à-vis companies. Especially when the data
processing is carried out by strong ‘Internet players’
with no establishment in the European Union, EU
citizens have a particularly disadvantageous posi-
tion. In such situations, the powers of a DPA, acting
as a guardian of citizens’ rights, are very limited. The
success of its enforcement actions against companies
based outside the EU would depend on the compa-
nies’ willingness to cooperate. The CJEU has howev-
er taken an active role in safeguarding the right to
the protection of personal data of EU citizens as il-
lustrated by some of its recent decisions concerning
the application of Directive 95/46/EC.
In Google Spain25, one of the main issues exam-
ined was the territorial scope of application of Direc-
tive 95/46/EC. By this judgment the CJEU recognised
not only a wide interpretation of the notion of ‘estab-
lishment’, so thatDirective 95/46/ECwouldbe applic-
able to companies from outside the EU (in this case
Internet search engine operators), but it also decid-
ed on the responsibility of such operators with re-
gard to data subject’s right.
The initial case concerned a complaint of a Span-
ish citizen. The complaint was directed against a dai-
ly newspaper, which republished personal informa-
tion regarding the recovery of old social security
debts of the complainant in its online version. The
complaintwasalsodirectedagainstGoogleSpainand
Google Inc., which made this information available
via the search engine. Whereas the Spanish DPA re-
jected the complaint against the newspaper it upheld
the case against Google Spain and Google Inc. Both
Google entities appealed the decision of the Spanish
DPA to the SpanishHighCourt, which joined the two
actions and forwarded the case to the CJEU as a ref-
erence for a preliminary ruling.
With regard to the territorial scope of application
of Directive 95/46/EC the Court found that Google
Spain is an establishment within the meaning of Ar-
ticle 4(1)(a) of Directive 95/46/EC because it engages
in the effective and real exercise of activity through
stable arrangements in Spain, has legal personality
and represents a subsidiary of Google Inc. on Span-
ish territory.26 Furthermore, the Court found that the
processing carried out in the context of search en-
gines operated by a non-EU based company such as
Google Inc. with an establishment in aMember State
is carried out ‘in the context of the activities’ of that
establishment (in this case Google Spain) if that es-
tablishment ‘is intended to promote and sell, in that
Member State, advertising space offered by the
search engine which serves to make the service of-
fered by that engine profitable’.27The CJEU held that
the activities of Google Inc. and Google Spain are ‘in-
extricably linked since the activities relating to the
advertising space constitute the means of rendering
the search engine at issue economically profitable
and that engine is, at the same time, the means en-
abling those activities to be performed’.28
As regards the responsibility of internet search en-
gine operators and the rights of the data subjects, the
24 Bygrave (n 18) 174.
25 Case C-131/12 Google Spain SL and Google Inc. v Agencia
Española de Protección de Datos (AEPD) and Mario Costeja
González [2014] EU:C:2014:317.
26 C-131/12, para 49 of the judgment.
27 C-131/12, para 55 of the judgment.
28 C-131/12, para 56 of the judgment.
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Court confirmed that29, a personhas a so-called ‘right
to be de-listed’, according to which he or she can, un-
der certain circumstances, request the removal of
links to personal information displayed by search en-
gines following a search based on a person’s name.
After this decision, the cooperation of DPAs has
played an essential role inmaking sure that the ‘right
to be de-listed’ would be interpreted and applied in
a coherent manner. More specifically, DPAs collabo-
rated within the A29 WP on the development of
guidelines for the unitary implementation of this
judgment. 30
A year later, the issues of applicable law and pow-
ers of DPAswere subject to examination by the CJEU
in Weltimmo31. This case concerned a company reg-
istered in Slovakia which ran a website for selling
Hungarian properties. For this purpose Weltimmo
processed the personal data of the advertisers of
those properties. The main two disputed problems
were that of applicable law and the competence and
powers of DPAs.
The Court analysed the question of which powers
a DPA can exercise when the data processing falls
under the substantive law of another Member
State.32TheA29WPalready pointed to the increased
legal complexity of bridging the possible gap be-
tween applicable law and supervisory jurisdiction,
back in 2011 when analysing Article 28(2) of Direc-
tive 95/46/EC.33 It is exactly this situation which was
addressed by the CJEU in its judgment. The Court
found that when the law applicable is that of anoth-
er Member State, a DPA still can and shall exercise
the powers it is endowed with by Article 28(3) of Di-
rective 95/46/EC, in particular its powers of investi-
gation. Such powers are however limited to the ter-
ritory of its ownMember State so that the DPA is not
entitled to impose sanctions on a controller estab-
lished in another Member State. This power belongs
to the DPA of the Member State the substantive law
ofwhich applies to the processing in question. In this
context the cooperation between the two DPAs has
to play an important role.34 This judgment also con-
firms that the Court is willing to go far in its inter-
pretation of the notion of ‘establishment’ in order to
guarantee efficient protection of affected data sub-
jects. As one author observes, such an interpretation
relies more on the notion of activities than on the ac-
tual place of establishment.35 The fact that the con-
troller’s activity is directed towards a certain Mem-
ber State and its residents – affected data subjects –
gains more weight than the actual place of establish-
ment.
Moreover, in theMaxSchrems36decision theCJEU
stressed once again the need to guarantee the inde-
pendence of DPAs37, which ismeant to ensure the ef-
fectiveness and reliability of the monitoring of com-
pliance.38 The substance of the case concerned data
transfers to a third country based on an adequacy de-
cision of the European Commission, namely the Safe
Harbour decision. Since its adoption, Safe Harbour
has allowed for data transfers to take place from the
EU to the United States (US), under the presumption
that the US ensures an adequate protection of per-
sonal data. This adequacy was indirectly challenged
by the complainantMaxSchrems. In this context one
of themain issues analysedby theCourtwaswhether
a DPA has the competence to examine a complaint
pertaining to an adequacy decision of the European
Commission. The CJEU ruling stressed once again
the independence of DPAs as the Court decided that
not even a Commission adequacy decision such as
Safe Harbour can prevent a DPA from examining a
person’s claim relating to the protection of its person-
al data as regards data transfers to third counties. A
DPA ‘must be able to examine, with complete inde-
pendence, whether the transfer of that data complies
with the requirements laid down by the directive’.39
In the case of Rease and Wullems, the CJEU was
supposed to answer the question whether a DPA is
29 Based on arts 12(b) and 14(a) of Directive 95/46/EC.
30 A29 WP, Guidelines on the implementation of the Court of
Justice of the European Union Judgment on “Google Spain and
Inc v. Agencia Espagnola de Proteccion de Datos (AEPD) and
Mario Costeja Gonzalez” C-131/12, WP 225 (26 November
2014).
31 Case C-230/14 Weltimmo (n 12).
32 See also Mark D. Cole and Andra Giurgiu, ‘The 'Minimal' Ap-
proach: the CJEU on the Concept of 'Establishment' Triggering
Jurisdiction for DPAs and Limitations of Their Sanctioning Powers
(Case C-230/14, Weltimmo)’ (2015) 1 EDPL 310–315.
33 A29 WP, Advice paper on the practical implementation of the
Article 28(6) of the Directive 95/46/EC (20 April 2011) 1.
34 C-230/14, para 57 of the judgement.
35 Anne Debet, ‘Arrêt Weltimmo: un nouvel élargissement par la
CJUE de la notion d'établissement’ (December 2015) 12 Commu-
nication Commerce électronique 37.
36 Case C-362/14 Schrems (n 3).
37 The judgment builds on previous CJEU decisions with regard to
the independence of DPAs: C‑518/07 Commission v Germany,
C‑614/10 Commission v Austria and C‑288/12 Commission v
Hungary.
38 C-362/14, para 41 of the judgment.
39 C-362/14, para 57 of the judgment.
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obliged in all cases to investigate a complaint. It had
to decide onwhether a DPA has themargin to set pri-
orities with regard to the enforcement of the protec-
tion of individuals that would result ‘in such enforce-
ment not taking place in the case where only an in-
dividual or a small group of persons submit a com-
plaint alleging a breach’40 of Directive 96/46/EC. Re-
grettably, the CJEU did not have the opportunity to
clarify this issue as the Dutch Council of State with-
drew the reference for a preliminary ruling.
These decisions clearly illustrate how difficult it
is to apply a directive adopted at a time when the In-
ternet was still in its infancy to the current data pro-
cessing realities. New ‘updated’ data protection leg-
islationwasmuchneeded to copewith the challenges
of intra and extra European cross-border processing
and to create the right premises for national DPAs to
fulfil their mission adequately.
II. Competence and Powers of DPAs
under the General Data Protection
Regulation
The newGeneral Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)
replaces the current Directive 95/46/EC41 with mod-
ern rules, better adapted to the Internet age. It is
based on the general rules and principles of the cur-
rentDirective,which it strengthens andextendsover-
all. In contrast to the Directive, the Regulation will
be directly applicable across the European Union. It
will thus harmonize data protection rules in the EU
and eliminate the current legal fragmentation and
uncertainty. The ambition of the Regulation was to
create data protection rules fit for the Digital Single
Market that would alleviate problems companies are
currently facing when doing business in the Union.
Additionally, they should give individuals more con-
trol over their personal data.42Most important in the
context of this contribution is the fact that the Reg-
ulation strengthens the role of national DPAs as
guardians of the respect of EU data protection law.
It does so by extending their competence, by deter-
mining clear and strong powers and by setting up a
mechanism for their cooperation in transnational
cases. The role of DPAs is thus reinforced and their
overall importance in the data protection landscape
significantly enhanced.43
1. New Extended and Layered
Competences for DPAs under the
GDPR
The GDPR introduces two different types of compe-
tences. These can be characterised as ‘single’ and ‘col-
laborative’.
The single competence of a DPA to deal alonewith
a case ismainlybasedon the territoriality principle.44
It can be ‘absolutely single’ (exclusive) or not. The
Regulation provides that the competence is fully ex-
clusive when the processing is carried out by public
authorities and public bodies orwhen it concerns op-
erations of courts acting in their judicial capacity.45
For such types of processing operations concerning
national matters no other DPA should be able to in-
terfere. There is a presumed and thus ‘relative’ sin-
gle competence when a DPA receives a complaint
which concerns only an establishment in its own
Member State or which relates to data subjects that
are affected only in the Member State of that DPA.46
Normally, the DPA should deal with the case alone,
with no interference from a foreign DPA as the mat-
ter appears to be purely local. For the sake of ensur-
ing consistency however, in case the interest in the
mattermight exceed the local context, theRegulation
states that the DPA has to inform the DPA in charge
of supervising the main or single establishment of
the controller or processor which can then decide
whether or not to participate in the case.47 The com-
petence could then become ‘collaborative’ if this DPA
also decides to engage in the case.
In addition to the general rule based on the terri-
toriality principle, the GDPR also introduces a ‘col-
40 C-192/15 Rease and Wullems, request for a preliminary ruling
from the Raad van State (Netherlands) lodged on 24 April 2015
(withdrawn).
41 The Regulation will enter into force on 24 May 2016 and shall
apply from 25 May 2018.
42 See also Andra Giurgiu and Gérard Lommel, ‘A new Approach to
EU Data Protection – More Control over Personal Data and
Increased Responsibility’ (2014) 1 Critical Quarterly for Legisla-
tion and Law (CritQ ) 10-27.
43 Peter Blume and Christian Wiese Svanberg, ‘The Proposed Data
Protection Regulation: The Illusion of Harmonisation, the Pri-
vate/Public Sector Divide and the Bureaucratic Apparatus’ (Janu-
ary 2013) 15 Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies
27-46.
44 GDPR, art 55 para 1.
45 GDPR, art paras 2 and 3.
46 GDPR, art 56 para 2.
47 GDPR, art 56 para 3.
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laborative’ competence. Such a competence is trig-
gered in cases of ‘cross-border processing,’48 when a
DPA has to cooperate with other DPAs.
Under the ‘collaborative’ competence a DPA can
be a ‘concerned’ or the ‘lead’ authority. The lead com-
petence of aDPA is determined according to theplace
of the main, respectively of the single establishment
of the controller or processor in the European
Union.49 The competence as concerned DPA can be
triggered by the fact that the controller or the proces-
sor is establishedon the territoryof theMemberState
of that DPA, because data subjects in its territory are
substantially affected or likely to be substantially af-
fected by the processing50 or because a complaint has
been lodged with it.51 Thus, if a company has sever-
al establishments in the European Union, the DPA of
the Member State of the main establishment will
have the lead competence, while the DPAs of the
States of the other establishments will act as con-
cerned DPAs. If a company has only one establish-
ment in the Union but the processing affects data
subjects in otherMember States, theDPAof the State
of the single establishment will have the lead, while
DPAs of the States of the affected data subjects are
considered to be concerned.
Thus the controversy partially solved by the CJEU
in Google Spain andWeltimmo is settled as Member
States’ DPAs gain clear competence as ‘concerned’
DPAs when companies are targeting their citizens.
Moreover, the competence is made independent of
the existence of an establishment of the company in
the Member State of the DPA, if data subjects resid-
ing in that State are affected by the processing.
For the purpose of finding a structured way of co-
operation between DPAs and consistency in the ap-
plication of the Regulation, the GDPRhas introduced
a so-called ‘one-stop-shop’ mechanism. It regulates
the way in which DPAs exercise their shared compe-
tence in cross-border cases with a wider impact in
the EU andwill be discussed further below. Previous-
ly, the next section will introduce the novelties re-
garding the powers of DPAs and explain how these
powers will be exercised under the one-stop-shop.
2. A Homogenous and Clear Set of
Powers for DPAs
As opposed to Directive 95/46/EC, the Regulation
now foresees a set of clearly defined tasks and pow-
ers equally applicable to all European DPAs. The
tasks circumscribe their fundamental duties, such as
monitoring and enforcing the application of the Reg-
ulation, promoting awareness, dealing with com-
plaints, cooperatingwith other DPAs etc.52. The pow-
ers represent themeans to perform these tasks.53The
powers of DPAs are now grouped into three main
categories, namely investigative powers, corrective
powers as well as authorisation and advisory pow-
ers.54
The investigative powers mainly refer to the pow-
ers of DPAs to carry out investigations in the form of
data protection audits or to review certifications is-
sued pursuant to the Regulation. They also include
the powers of DPAs to receive from the controller or
processor the access to data and to the premises,
equipment and information needed for the purpose
of carrying out the investigation.55
In exercising their authorisation and advisory
powers, DPAs can issue opinions directed at the na-
tional legislator, advise controllers or processors as
well as, among others, authorise certain types of pro-
cessingoperationswhich requireprior authorisation.
They can approve codes of conduct and binding cor-
porate rules, accredit certification bodies or adopt
standard contractual clauses.56
Butprobably the strongest andmost coercive func-
tion of future DPAs lies within the exercise of their
corrective powers. These range from the application
of milder sanctions like issuing warnings to the con-
48 The first situation of cross-border processing requires the presence
of two or more establishments of the controller or processor in
the EU, provided the processing takes place in the context of the
activities of the establishments. Secondly, there will be cross-
border processing when there is only one establishment in the
Union, with the additional requirement that the processing sub-
stantially affects or is likely to substantially affect data subjects in
more than one Member State. The Regulation itself does however
not determine any threshold or give any indications under which
circumstances data subjects are ‘substantially’ affected. For the
definition of the term ‘cross-border processing of personal data’,
see art 4 para 23 GDPR.
49 GDPR, art 56 para 1.
50 As a novelty, the GDPR will have an extraterritorial effect. It will
apply also to companies based outside the EU, which offer goods
or services to data subjects in the Union or which monitor the
data subjects’ behaviour, see art 3 para 2 GDPR.
51 GDPR, art 4 para 22.
52 For an exhaustive list see art 57 GDPR.
53 Although this is not explicitly stated in the GDPR, the distinction
results from Recital 63 Directive 95/46/EC.
54 GDPR, art 58.
55 ibid para 1.
56 ibid para 3.
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troller or processor or ordering the compliance with
data subjects’ requests to more severe ones like or-
dering the erasure of the data, imposing a ban on
processing or suspending data flows to a third coun-
try.57 Most importantly, the position of DPAs is
strengthened by the fact that supervisory authorities
are now clearly – in the GDPR itself as opposed to
leaving it to be defined by the national laws - en-
dowed with the power to impose administrative
fines.58 These can go as high as €20 million, or for
undertakings - up to 4% of the total worldwide an-
nual turnover of the preceding financial year,
whichever is higher.59
During the long legislative process,which preclud-
ed the adoption of the GDPR, one of the main points
of discussion concerned exactly the powers of DPAs
and theway inwhich these should be divided among
supervisory authorities in the process of their coop-
eration under the one-stop-shop mechanism, which
will be discussed below.
3. A Structured Way of Cooperation for
DPAs under the One-Stop-Shop
UnderDirective 95/46/EC, a companydoingbusiness
in severalMemberStateshas todeal andcomplywith
the national rules as implemented and interpreted
by various DPAs, each competent for supervising the
processing activities of the same company. This sit-
uation is not only burdensome for businesses in the
EUbut also detrimental for the rights of the data sub-
jects. It leads to a lack of harmonisation in the appli-
cation of EU data protection rules by DPAs which
have to act under different implementing laws of Di-
rective 95/46/EC.
Under the new Regulation however such compa-
nies will have a single DPA as a contact point. If a
company is conducting business in more than one
Member State and has at least one establishment in
the EU, it will have to deal with a single DPA (lead
DPA). Under the new60 ‘one-stop-shop’ mechanism,
the lead DPA will coordinate the supervision of all
the processing activities of that business throughout
the EU, in collaboration with other ‘concerned’
DPAs.61 Moreover, the Regulation now also sets out
clear time frames and responsibilities for this mod-
el of collaboration between DPAs.
The one-stop-shop mechanism provides that in
transnational matters the lead DPA will have to in-
volve all concernedDPAs before adopting ameasure.
It has to communicate all relevant information as
well as submit draft decisions to other concerned
DPAs. Thus other DPAs are given the possibility to
object to the submitted draft within a time frame of
four weeks. If the lead DPA agrees to the possible ob-
jections of the other DPAs it will have to resubmit a
draft decision for opinion within the shorter time
frame of two weeks. After agreement has been
reached, it is up to the lead DPA to adopt and notify
the decision to the main or single establishment of
the company and to inform the other concerned au-
thorities as well as the European Data Protection
Board (EDPB) - which will be discussed further, to-
gether with the consistency mechanism - and, if nec-
essary, the authority of the complainant.
If such a decision concerns a complaint, the fol-
lowing three situations can be distinguished as re-
gards its adoption and its notification to the relevant
parties. Firstly, when a complaint is admitted and all
DPAs agree on the decision, it shall be adopted by the
lead DPA,whichwill also notify the company, where-
as the local DPA shall inform the complainant. Se-
condly, if a complaint is rejected or dismissed, the lo-
cal DPA of the complainant shall adopt the decision,
notify the complainant and inform the controller.
And thirdly, a complaint can be only partially dis-
missed or rejected. In such a case the responsibility
for taking action is shared between the lead and the
local DPA. For the part of the complaint which is re-
57 ibid para 2.
58 GDPR, art 53 para 1(b).
59 GDPR, art 83 paras 4 and 5.
60 The one-stop-shop has triggered a lot of debate during the negoti-
ation process. Intensive discussions revolved around the issue of
division of powers between DPAs and how the cooperation
should work in practice. The main questions were whether the
competence of the lead DPA should be exclusive or not with
regard to other DPAs and whether this exclusivity should concern
all or only some of the powers DPAs are endowed with.
As initially proposed by the European Commission, the one-stop-
shop had a more conflictive character as it was supposed to
offer a solution in cases when DPAs did not manage to come to
an agreement as regards the adoption of a certain measure with a
transnational impact. At the end of the institutional trilogue
however, the GDPR provided for a one-stop-shop that relies on
the consensus of the DPAs. For conflictual situations between
DPAs the Regulation foresees a consistency mechanism. If DPAs
do not manage to come to an agreement, consistency will be
triggered, so that the question of exclusivity of powers under the
one-stop-shop does not raise issues any longer. See also Andra
Giurgiu, Gertjan Boulet and Paul De Hert, ‘EU’s One-Stop-Shop
Mechanism: Thinking Transnational’ (2015) 137 Privacy Laws and
Business, International Report 16-17.
61 GDPR, art 60.
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jected, the responsibility to adopt that part of the de-
cision, notify the complainant and inform the con-
troller or processor belongs to the local DPA of the
complainant. In this case the lead DPA is responsible
for adopting the part of the decision that concerns
actions with regard to the controller or processor, for
his notification as well as for informing the com-
plainant. It is generally the responsibility of the con-
troller or processor to ensure the decision is imple-
mented in all establishments involved in the process-
ing and to inform the lead DPA of the measures it
has taken.62
The Regulation also provides for a derogation
from the application of the one-stop-shop, by setting
up an urgency procedure for exceptional circum-
stances when a DPA considers that it is urgent to act
so as to protect the interests of data subjects.63
4. Mandatory Consistency and the
European Data Protection Board as a
Gatekeeper in Matters with a
Transnational Impact
The new consistency mechanism is a fundamental
pillar, which together with co-operation and mutual
assistance is meant to ensure a harmonized applica-
tion of the Regulation throughout the Union in cas-
es of cross-border relevance. A central actor in this
scheme, aside from the concerned and lead DPAs, is
the EDPB.64 It replaces the current A29 WP group,
and unlike its predecessor, will actually have legal
personality as well as the power to adopt binding de-
cisions. This makes the EDPB, unlike the A29 WP, a
significantly stronger player in the enforcement of
EU data protection rules.
The consistency mechanism is explicitly manda-
tory in two situations. Consistency is compulsory
when a DPA plans to adopt a measure intended to
produce legal effects in relation to processing opera-
tions that substantially affect a significant number
of data subjects in several Member States. The Reg-
ulation lists in Article 64(1) a number of clearly de-
fined measures for the adoption of which a DPA has
to submit a draft decision to the EDPB, requesting its
prior opinion. These measures concern for example
the adoption of a list of processing operations that
require a data protection impact assessment or the
approval of binding corporate rules. When express-
ly mandatory, consistency is also a precondition for
the lawfulness of these measures.65 For these cases
the Regulation does not explicitly give the EDPB di-
rect binding powers. It states however that when a
DPA does not follow the opinion of the EDPB any au-
thority concerned or the Commission may commu-
nicate the matter to the European Data Protection
Board66 thus triggering consistency and indirectly
giving the EDPB the final word.
In the second situation listed in Article 65(1) of the
GDPR, consistency fulfils the role of a dispute reso-
lution mechanism, in which the EDPB functions as
a dispute resolution body.When the concernedDPAs
cannot reach an agreement under the one-stop-shop
mechanism or when there are conflicting views on
which of the concerned supervisory authorities is
competent for the main establishment (lead DPA),
consistency should be triggered and theEDPB should
intervene with binding decisions.
The Regulation provides however that as long as
a matter is of general application or produces legal
effects in more than one Member State, any supervi-
sory authority (regardless of competence), the Chair
of the EDPB or the Commission can request that a
matter is dealt with under the consistency mecha-
nism.67
As regards the procedural aspects, EDPB decisions
are adopted either by a simple majority of its mem-
bers for the list of mandatory cases mentioned in Ar-
ticle 64(1)68 or by two-third majority when the EDPB
functions as a dispute resolution body69. The deci-
sions have to be notified to the concerned DPAs and
to the Commission as well as be published on the
EDPBwebsite. To ensure proximity70 to the data sub-
ject, the EDPB decisions have to be adopted by the
lead, respectively by the concernedDPA, ‘without un-
due delay and at the latest by one month’ after their
notification by the EDPB and notified to the relevant
62 GDPR, art 60 para 10.
63 GDPR, art 60 para 11 and art 66 GDPR.
64 GDPR, arts 68-76.
65 GDPR, Recital 138.
66 GDPR, art 65 para 1(c).
67 GDPR, art 64 para 2.
68 ibid para 3.
69 GDPR, art 65 para 2.
70 Proximity refers to the possibility for ‘individual data subjects to
have redress before a DPA within the Member State where they
reside and to have access to justice in this same Member State,
directly and upon appeal against a decision of this DPA’, see
Hijmans (n 5) 387.
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parties following the general procedure as foreseen
for the one-stop-shop71. They can be challenged by
bringing an action for annulment before the CJEU
under the conditions of Article 263 TFEU.72
In view of the procedure, onemight conclude that
the EDPB has the final word in actually all cases in
which individual DPAs might disagree. This could
call into question the matter of sovereignty and in-
dependence of national DPAs. As already pointed out
by one author ‘where the EDPB uses these [binding]
powers, the national DPAs are no longer sovereign
to ensure the control of the EU rules on data protec-
tion’.73 As a consequence, DPAs might tend to avoid
‘outsourcing’ their powers to the EDPB and try to
solve the issues through cooperation within the one-
stop-shop mechanism rather than triggering consis-
tency.
Given its binding powers it could be furthermore
questioned, like the same author pointed out,
whether the EDPB still qualifies as a structured net-
work of national authorities rather than as a DPA
within the meaning of Article 16(2) TFEU and Arti-
cle 8(3) Charter. In this latter case it could be argued
that the EDPD has to fulfil the requirements of inde-
pendence as laid down in the CJEU case law just like
a national DPA.74
The aim of the Regulation to create the same lev-
el of data protection all over the EU through the di-
rect applicability of the GDPR with the strong posi-
tion of the EDPBmight also raise issues of a possible
race ‘towards’ the bottom. This could especially be
the case for countries with a strong data protection
culture forced to succumb to perhaps more moder-
ate opinions of the EDPB that would ensure consis-
tency at the cost of having a lower level or protection.
This might be the price that will have to be paid for
harmonisation through a regulation instead of hav-
ing a directive which allows more flexibility in its
transposition by Member States.
III. Conclusions: Stronger and More
‘European’ DPAs as Guardians of
Consistency?
The application of the already outdated data protec-
tion rules of Directive 95/46/EC has hitherto been
‘stretched’ in order to cope with an era of ubiquitous
computing. It was high time for this new piece of leg-
islation, better suited to address the challenges of the
current data processing realities, to step in. The Reg-
ulation is definitely not a total game changer, as it is
still relying in many ways on the current Directive,
but it does bring significant innovations within the
data protection landscape for all the actors involved.
The main worry expressed is how these changes will
affect companies and data subjects. However, one
cannot answer this question without examining the
way in which DPAs will work in the future under the
new rules.While first analysing the drawbacks of the
current Directive 95/46/EC with a view to the rele-
vant CJEU case-law, this article pointed out the exist-
ing problems under the current framework before
examining if and to what extent these are mended
by the GDPR.
The new competences and powers of DPAs under
the GDPR are definitely putting national data protec-
tion authorities in a stronger position to enforce EU
data protection law. The enlarged scope of applica-
tion of the Regulation, a clear set of powers for DPAs,
the one-stop-shop and the consistency mechanism
coupled with DPAs’ possibility to apply high fines in
cases of infringementswill ensure a higher andmore
consistent level of protection of EU residents in rela-
tion to both EU and non-EU based companies. The
A29 WP refers in its action plan for the implemen-
tation of the GDPR to a ‘brand new governance mod-
el’ 75, consisting of distributed governance built on
three pillars namely, national DPAs, their coopera-
tion and the EDPB for ensuring consistency.
The recent CJEU jurisprudence under Directive
95/46/EC already tackled some important issues as
regards applicable law as well as competences and
powers of DPAs. Here the Court confirmed a wide
scope of application of EU data protection law ac-
cording to the ‘effects principle’ rather thanmere ter-
ritoriality, especially with regard to non-EU compa-
nies.76This principle is however not absolute and ne-
cessitates a case-by-case assessment. Some essential
questions, such as the applicable law to an EU-based
companyoperating inseveralMemberStates, are still
71 GDPR, art 65 para 6.
72 GDPR, Recital 143.
73 Hijmans (n 5) 386.
74 ibid 381.
75 A29 WP, Statement on the 2016 action plan for the implementa-
tion of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), WP 236
(2 February 2016) 2.
76 See also Paul de Hert and Michal Czerniawski, ‘Expanding the
European data protection scope beyond territory: Article 3 of the
General Data Protection Regulation in its wider context’ (July
2016) International Data Privacy Law 1-14.
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unclear.77 Is it only the law of the State of the head-
quarters of the company acting as a controller or al-
so the laws of the other Member States where the
company has establishments, a problemnot clarified
in Weltimmo.78
The majority of the questions examined by the
CJEU in its latest jurisprudence under the old and for
the Internet era unfitted Directive 95/46/EC have
been envisaged and solved by the new GDPR. Non-
EU companies conducting business in the EU and
processing data of EU residents will in future fall un-
der EU data protection law and EU DPAs will have
clear competence. Internet-enabled cross-border da-
ta processing is better addressed through one single
EU-wide applicable Regulation under which several
‘concerned’ DPAs will have the duty to cooperate us-
ing the one-stop-shopmechanism. If they don’t man-
age to come to an agreement, consistency can be trig-
gered with the possible involvement of the EDPB as
a ‘consistency gatekeeper’79.
However, as promising as the new provisions
sound in theory, the future practical application of
the enforcement rules in a consistent and effective
manner will prove to be essential. Concern was ex-
pressed that consensual decision-making, involving
all concerned DPAs, ‘does not necessarily guarantee
themost prompt and hence, effective response’.80Al-
though a legitimate fear, we consider that the Regu-
lation addresses this problem by setting clear and
fixeddeadlineswhichDPAswill have to respectwhen
taking action. Conversely, under the current Direc-
tive 95/46/EC, cooperation took place on an informal
level, providing DPAs with no clear institutionalized
framework under which they could force a timely re-
sponse from their peers when dealing with transna-
tional matters.
Aside fromthe issue concerning thepractical func-
tionality of DPA cooperation, the new rules also raise
concerns as regards more subtle issues such as that
of independence and sovereignty of national DPAs
under the Regulation.
We have seen that already under Directive
95/46/EC, DPAs have a hybrid position in between
national law and EU law. Under the new Regulation,
they become even more ‘European’ and thus more
trapped between their own national rules and the EU
law. This becomes even clearer when DPAs have to
implementEDPBdecisions. They are liable beforena-
tional courts for decisions they are not sovereign in
taking81. The A29 Working Party raised the concern
already in 2012, that consistency should be applied
‘only there where it is necessary’ and that it ‘should
not encroach upon the independence of national su-
pervisory authorities and should leave the responsi-
bilities of the different actors where they belong’.82
Since the adoption of Directive 95/46/EC, DPAs
have acted as the main guardians of the rights of in-
dividuals and will continue to do so under the new
GDPR. As such, they will be responsible for monitor-
ing and enforcing compliancewith the new data pro-
tection rules of the Regulation. The effectiveness of
DPAs will have a direct impact on the level of protec-
tion of citizen’s rights as well as on the day-to-day
business of companies and will thus play a signifi-
cant role in the success of the GDPR. It is therefore
also important to acknowledge and highlight the
needofmaking sure thatDPAsbenefit fromadequate
resources in terms of staffing and financial means so
as to be able to successfully carry out their missions.
77 As regards the missed opportunity by the CJEU to address the
possible application of several national laws depending on the
various stages of processing see also Cole and Giurgiu (n 32) 313.
78 See also A29 WP, Update of Opinion 8/2010 on applicable law
(n 11).
79 Paul de Hert, Vangelis Papakonstantinou, The new General
Data Protection Regulation: Still a sound system for the protection
of individuals?, in Computer Law & Security Review 36/2016, p
193.
80 Hijmans (n 5) 386.
81 With regard to the issue of independence of DPAs see also
Hijmans (n 5) 311, 343-344 and 380.
82 A29 WP, Opinion 01/2012 on the data protection reform propos-
als, WP 191 (23 March 2012) 20.
